Transnational Class Actions in the Shadow of Preclusion

S. judges, for example, have refused to certify classes that include citizens of foreign countries that may not recognize U.S. class judgments. This Article shows that this conventional wisdom is misdirected: citizenship is the wrong measure, courts are poorly positioned to identify relitigation risks, and the social costs of excluding option holders may well outweigh the benefits. Instead, courts should certify classes of foreign and domestic plaintiffs in service of policy goals such as deterrence and intraclass fairness regardless of foreign preclusion law. At the same time, this Article suggests innovative approaches to achieve some preclusion previously unremarked upon in transnational cases. Prior approaches are insufficient, in part, because they rely on courts without acknowledging the informational asymmetries between courts and parties or the limited tools available for judicial resolution. This Article explains how private incentives and private information may fill the gap in interjurisdictional preclusion law. Parties should be encouraged to negotiate private preclusion agreements in cases in which preclusion matters. In addition, courts can coordinate informally to curb costly relitigation. In summary, this Article uses values derived from lawmaking choices and a practical assessment of the litigation environment to respond to litigation options in transnational class actions not by excluding option holders but instead by permitting aggregation and seeking alternatives to preclusion law. This Article applies these lessons to transnational class actions filed in a single jurisdiction (e.g., a U.S. court), as well as to dueling class actions filed in two countries simultaneously and to U.S. recognition of foreign aggregate judgments whatever their form.
INTRODUCTION
Transnational class actions are class actions, likely involving plaintiffs from multiple nations, that may be filed in the courts of more than one country.
1
Transnational class actions address topics from human rights to consumer protection to securities law. 2 To give one example, in Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd., a New York federal court considered a putative class action arising out of the Bernard Madoff scandal that comprised investors from more than thirty countries. 3 At first glance, the party structure of Anwar would seem unremarkable. The Madoff scandal touched investors across the globe, American courts are open to foreign litigants, and nothing inherent in the class action should limit it to U.S. citizens. Transnational class actions, if not routine, are at least not unexpected in a global economy. But the court in Anwar was dubious. Relying on a line of cases stretching back to Judge Henry Friendly, 4 the court expressed concern about some of the foreign class members. The judge noted that U.S. class judgments are not uniformly enforceable around the world-there is no international law of preclusion, 5 and many foreign courts will not treat class judgments as binding on passive plaintiffs. 6 The result is an asymmetry between defendants bound by a 5. Preclusion refers to the effect of prior adjudication in future proceedings. It includes the concepts of claim preclusion (merger and bar) and issue preclusion (collateral estoppel). See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, ch. 3 (1982) .
6. "Passive plaintiffs" refers to plaintiffs in opt-out class actions who neither affirmatively opt out nor affirmatively opt in. The Appendix to this Article provides summaries of foreign-aggregation procedures and foreign-court recognition of U.S. class judgments, derived from scholarly treatments and court decisions. It also catalogs sources for further study. See Zachary D. Clopton, Transnational Class Actions in the Shadow of Preclusion: Appendix Only, SOC. SCI. RES. NETWORK, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2609339 (last The conventional wisdom, to the extent it exists, rejects litigation options and the asymmetric risk of relitigation they represent. The Anwar decision is one example of this thinking. Judge Friendly, in Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., offered perhaps the earliest version of this approach to transnational class actions, declaring that "if defendants prevail against a class they are entitled to a victory no less broad than a defeat would have been." 11 In Anwar, Bersch, and many cases in between, 12 courts have sought to identify foreign plaintiffs with litigation options and deny them opt-out class treatment. The scholarly consensus in this area, though perhaps more nuanced, accepts this general approach. 13 The aim of this Article is to show that the judicial and scholarly consensus is wrong. It is wrong because it does not account for certain important features of transnational litigation. And it is wrong because the costs of litigation options are updated June 2, 2015).
7. This Article uses "litigation options" both to reflect the everyday meaning of "option" as well as to make an analogy to financial options. For further explanation, see infra Part I. As noted below, Professors Ratliff and Nagareda identified related options in U.S. civil procedure. See infra note 16 and accompanying text.
8. The Pitcairn Islands group is a British Overseas Territory. It comprises the islands of Pitcairn, Henderson, Ducie and Oeno. Pitcairn, the only inhabited island, is a small volcanic outcrop situated in the South Pacific . . . . With a population of only around fifty, the people of Pitcairn are descended from the mutineers of HMAV Bounty and their Tahitian companions. Pitcairn Island is approximately 3.2km (2 miles) long and 1.6km (1 mile) wide with the capital Adamstown located above Bounty Bay and accessed by the aptly named road, "The Hill of Difficulty." GOV'T PITCAIRN ISLANDS, http://www.government.pn.
9. Tokelau consists of three atolls in the South Pacific and has a population of fewer than two thousand. See About Us, GOV'T TOKELAU, http://www.tokelau.org.nz/About+Us.html.
10. Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd., 289 F.R.D. 105, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) , vacated and remanded on other grounds by St. Stephen's Sch. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers Accountants N.V., 570 F. App'x 37 (2d Cir. 2014 ). 11. 519 F.2d 974, 996 (2d Cir. 1975 , abrogated as stated in Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Grp., 729 F. Supp. 2d 620 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) .
12. See infra notes 49-62 and accompanying text. 13. See infra notes 63-70 and accompanying text.
overstated and the benefits of keeping transnational classes together are underappreciated. Litigation options present inherent and instrumental problems-inherently, fairness seems to require equal stakes, and instrumentally, equal stakes promote accurate outcomes. But these problems must be viewed against a clear-eyed assessment of the litigation environment: crude measures like citizenship do not explain when relitigation is permissible or likely, courts may have poor information about when relitigation may happen, the threat of foreign relitigation is likely overstated, and the costs of excluding option holders (e.g., to deterrence) may be significant. For these reasons, the mere presence of litigation options should not be a bar to class certification.
Importantly, though, certifying option holders means that relitigation may be possible. By focusing on the certification decision, current approaches have overlooked other opportunities to curb relitigation. Private approaches may achieve additional preclusion by channeling private information and incentives, without sacrificing the policy objectives furthered by aggregation. Interjurisdictional judicial coordination can harness private incentives to turn the challenge of dueling class actions into a response to litigation options. 14 This Article proceeds as follows. Part I expands on the concept of litigation options with a focus on transnational class actions. This Part also highlights the limited scholarly and judicial attention paid to this concept to date, showing a consensus that asks courts to deny certification to certain foreign citizens. Part II offers a new strategy for aggregation in transnational class actions. Subpart A explains why the exclusion of option holders is misguided, both in its execution and its reliance on judicial competence. With this assessment in mind, Subpart B considers the costs of excluding litigation option holders in terms of deterrence, compensation, and fairness. This analysis connects with scholars' conceptions of the class action as a tool of regulatory policy as much as, if not more than, merely a mass joinder device. 15 The conclusion of Part II is that litigation options in transnational class actions should not bar class certification.
Against a background of certified transnational class actions, Part III considers alternative strategies to respond to the threat of asymmetric relitigation. Taking a cue from scholars who understand class actions as litigation transactions, 16 this Part proposes a transactional approach to preclusion uncertainty-tapping into private information and private incentives to induce preclusion through bargaining. In addition, this Part suggests innovative approaches to achieve interjurisdictional preclusion in dueling class actions and other circumstances.
Part IV turns briefly to a different vantage. Once a foreign court enters a judgment in a class action or other aggregate proceeding, how should U.S. courts treat that judgment? This Part demonstrates that the insights of this Article support and elaborate existing U.S. rules for foreign judgment recognition and domestic class action preclusion. In short, this approach values legislative preferences about aggregation and preclusion, but is sensitive to due process interests as well.
In sum, this Article approaches litigation options in transnational class actions from a position that links procedural forms to substantive law values. The class action is not an end in itself but a tool to effectuate deterrence and compensation, to mitigate conflicts among putative class members, and to manage complex disputes. In responding to the transnational litigation environment, this Article attempts to tap into the strengths of legislatures, courts, and private parties to create default welfare-enhancing rules while also harnessing private information and incentives in service of these policy goals. For both aggregation and preclusion, good policy must account for substantive choices, informational asymmetries, and differing institutional capabilities and incentives.
The analysis undertaken in this Article primarily employs the perspective of a U.S. court hearing a transnational class action. The United States is a natural example because, although not alone among jurisdictions with class action procedures, it is by far the most significant in terms of magnitude of cases and commentary. Further, readers likely are most familiar with the background rules of U.S. law and the substantive values that motivate U.S. procedural choices, which are important in responding to litigation options. But the lessons of this Article would be relevant to any court hearing a transnational case-and, indeed, the Appendix collects many Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129 REV. (2004 17 This collection of foreign approaches is also significant for what it says about the importance of these questions. If litigation options are created when multiple forums allow for cost-effective litigation of the same claim, then the rise of foreign aggregate litigation means that transnational litigation options will only become more prevalent. 18 In other words, courts should expect to see more and more cases like those addressed in this Article, thereby amplifying the consequences of policy responses to transnational litigation options.
I. LITIGATION OPTIONS AND TRANSNATIONAL CLASS ACTIONS
The class action is a procedural tool that advances substantive law values such as deterrence, compensation, fairness, and efficiency.
19 Opt-out class actions in particular achieve these goals by aggregating claims not only of active participants but also of passive plaintiffs. 20 In so doing, the opt-out class action can increase 17. See Clopton, supra note 6. The insights here also may be extended to litigation optionality in purely domestic cases. See infra Parts II.B, III (discussing domestic litigation options).
18. REV. 1849 REV. (1998 . This feature of the class action is in tension with the day-in-court ideal. See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U. S. 755, 762 (1989) (referring to "our 'deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone have his own day in court'" (citation omitted)); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U. S. 32, 40 (1940) ("It is a principle of general application in Anglo-American jurisprudence that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of process."). REV. 571 (1997) . The United States is not alone in foregoing the individual day in court in some cases. In Wendenburg v. Germany, for example, the European Court of Human Rights explained that "in proceedings involving a decision for a collective number of individuals, it is not always required or even possible that every individual is heard before a court." 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. 28 (2003) . deterrence and compensation while reducing potential collective-action problems among putative class members.
21
When some class members are not bound by the outcome and can litigate their case again, "litigation options" result. The term "litigation options" has both a conventional and technical meaning. Conventionally, passive plaintiffs can choose between accepting the first outcome and waiting for a future case. Technically, in finance an option is the right of the option holder to buy or sell an asset at a set price. The option holder can choose, based on all available information, when to exercise the option. If the option holder has the right to buy an asset for fifty dollars, for example, then her option would be "in the money" when the market price of the asset is more than fifty dollars. 22 In the class action, passive plaintiffs who are not bound by the first adjudication hold litigation options. 23 The litigation option is the right to become a party to litigation and capture any settlement or judgment that results. An option holder in a class action could exercise her option to join the class and be bound by its outcome. Or, she could wait until the first case was resolved, and if she were unsatisfied with the outcome, she could retain the option and join a new suit (e.g., in a foreign court). Indeed, if the second suit were an opt-out class action as well, 24 the option holder could wait until both class actions were resolved before deciding how to exercise the option. 25 Like owners of financial options, the litigation option holder exercises her option when it is in the money.
26
Granting litigation options (at no charge) creates a facial imbalance between plaintiffs and defendants that "immediately strikes us as unfair."
27 If the defendant loses, passive plaintiffs will exercise their options and reap the rewards. But if the defendant wins, passive plaintiffs can bring another suit and try again in a second suit. Heads I win; tails you lose.
Litigation options also have potentially injurious social-welfare consequences. Public-and private-law litigation serves important social goals such as compensation 21. See infra Part II.B.1. 22. See WILLIAM W. BRATTON, CORPORATE FINANCE 183-98 (7th ed. 2012) . If the option holder has the right to buy an asset, she holds a "call option"; if she has the right to sell, it is a "put option. " Id. at 183. 23 . One might characterize the litigation option as a call. See supra note 22. The call option holder has the right to buy a share in the litigation. In theory, the strike price for litigation call options is zero. In practice, it may be that the strike price is right to relitigate. Exercising a litigation option by claiming on a settlement fund likely requires a release, see infra note 168, and it is more difficult to relitigate after claiming on a successful judgment, see infra note 139 and accompanying text.
24. See Clopton, supra note 6 (collecting examples of foreign jurisdictions with opt-out style mass litigation).
25. Option holders likely could claim the benefit of a case during litigation, during the claim period following settlement or judgment, or as long as they have causes of action to which nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel applies. See infra note 137 and accompanying text (discussing nonmutual estoppel).
26. The claim here is not that everything that is true about financial options would be true about litigation options. The goal of the comparison is to signify which passive plaintiffs may be able to relitigate abroad, see infra Part II.A; to suggest that options may be priced, see infra note 211; and to highlight the dynamic among plaintiffs and defendants across multiple forums.
27. Ratliff, supra note 16, at 77. and deterrence. 28 If litigation produces systematically inaccurate results, it distorts the underlying substantive law. 29 Litigation options threaten to do just that because they asymmetrically increase plaintiffs' expected recovery and settlement leverage against defendants.
30 Defendants worried about the asymmetric risk of relitigation would be more interested in buying global peace than would be socially optimal (assuming that the one-shot litigation is calibrated to the socially optimal level).
31
Unless the class action is binding on all class members, therefore, there exists an asymmetry that may have costs to defendants and to social welfare.
In REV. 2035 REV. , 2076 REV. -80, 2116 REV. (2008 . Yet this is a fallacy that courts (including the Supreme Court) have indulged, id., and no doubt some due process is required for any judgment to be binding (with or without Shutts).
full-faith-and-credit obligations, 34 class judgments may bind class members in other U.S. courts whether they were active or passive participants in the first suit.
Binding all class members not only equalizes stakes between plaintiffs and defendants but also responds to potential conflicts of interest within the class. Mass claims present classic collective-action problems in which each potential plaintiff would prefer to free ride on other plaintiffs' litigation efforts. 35 At the same time, agency problems within the class (and with respect to class counsel) create costs of their own. 36 In U.S. courts, class judgments may be preclusive against all class members, thus responding to the collective-action problem, while requiring notice, 37 opt out, 38 and judicial supervision 39 to deal with agency costs. Indeed, U.S. courts have found such due process protections necessary to make opt-out class actions binding on passive plaintiffs.
40
The foregoing description shows how U.S. courts achieve symmetric preclusion in opt-out class actions. But there is at least one notable exception to this stylized story: transnational class actions. 41 While U.S. courts grant full faith and credit to sister court judgments, there is no international legal obligation for foreign courts to do the same. As it turns out, many foreign legal systems are reluctant to give preclusive effect to class judgments as applied to passive plaintiffs. 42 It may be that foreign jurisdictions do not accept notice, opt out, and court supervision as sufficient protections for passive plaintiffs, or simply that they reject class actions as a method of dispute resolution. 43 In any event, if it is true that foreign courts may not enforce class judgments against passive plaintiffs, then those plaintiffs possess litigation options. Any passive class member with access to a foreign forum gets the benefit of 34. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; 28 U. S.C. § 1738 (2012) . See generally Stephen B. Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and Federal Common Law: A General Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 733 (1986); Robert C. Casad, Issue Preclusion and Foreign Country Judgments: Whose Law?, 70 IOWA L. REV. 53 (1984) .
35. For example, it would be cheaper for plaintiffs to sit out the first suit and then use nonmutual offensive issue preclusion to sue defendant or extract a settlement. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U. S. 322, 326-33 (1979 58 In addressing superiority, the Vivendi court acknowledged the logic of Bersch and its progeny, though it asked whether foreign nonrecognition was "more likely than not" rather than applying Bersch's "near certainty" test. 59 After surveying the recognition law of France, England, Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands, 60 the court concluded that French, English, and Dutch plaintiffs would remain in the class because the courts of those nations more likely than not would give preclusive effect to the U.S. judgment. 61 German and Austrian plaintiffs were excluded because their courts, more likely than not, would not treat a U.S. class judgment as preclusive. The few scholarly commentaries to address these issues tend to track this logic. At least two articles directly advocated the Bersch-Vivendi model-that is, to exclude some or all foreign plaintiffs from U.S. classes if they seem to possess asymmetric opportunities for relitigation. 63 Professor Rhonda Wasserman also seemed to suggest that an exclusionary approach is appropriate for these foreign plaintiffs.
64 Professor Tanya Monestier agreed that asymmetric relitigation is problematic, though her response allowed foreign plaintiffs to participate if they affirmatively opted in. 65 Thus, rather than completely excluding foreign plaintiffs, Monestier relegated them to a separate, opt-in group. Finally, Professors Simard and Tidmarsh offered a more nuanced approach. 66 They proposed a series of presumptions designed to identify which plaintiffs in which cases are most likely to relitigate 67 -a topic this Article picks up below.
68 Simard and Tidmarsh then excluded those foreign plaintiffs likely to relitigate while allowing those that are not likely to relitigate to remain in the class. 98, 107, 125, 138, 164 . Differences between this Article's approach and Simard and Tidmarsh's include the following: (i) parties have better information than courts about relitigation risk; (ii) opt-in mechanisms improve upon exclusionary approaches, but do not eliminate underdeterrence (and undercompensation); (iii) including all potential class members (including option holders) maximizes substantive law values; and (iv) private information and incentives can help to reduce overdeterrence. The proposals in Parts III and IV also materially differ from that of Simard and Tidmarsh, which fails to discuss private mechanisms or foreign judgments.
67 What unifies these scholarly approaches, and the judicial opinions cited above, is that they ask courts to identify relevant foreign plaintiffs and exclude them from opt-out class actions. These courts and scholars are right to recognize that litigation options create asymmetries. But, as described below, these approaches fail to identify relevant option holders and understate the consequences of excluding some or all foreign plaintiffs. A better approach is sensitive to the transnational litigation environment and to the substantive law values that motivate these cases.
II. AGGREGATING OPTION HOLDERS
As explained in the previous Part, litigation options in transnational class actions produce asymmetries between plaintiffs and defendants, which may create social costs from skewed results and may be unfair to defendants and other plaintiffs. The law of preclusion is designed to solve these problems. Among U.S. jurisdictions, full faith and credit provides that sister-state judgments are given the preclusive effect assigned by the rendering jurisdiction, 71 and the Supreme Court has (more or less) suggested that class resolutions are binding on absentees to the same extent as traditional judgments.
72
The first-best approach, therefore, aligns preclusion rules across international jurisdictions using a full-faith-and-credit model. 73 If foreign jurisdictions gave class judgments the same preclusive effect as would the rendering court, then the interjurisdictional nature of a suit would not create new option holders. An international treaty on judgment preclusion would be an obvious and simple response to litigation options, and indeed international law is an oft-mentioned solution to the challenges of transnational litigation. S. 797, 823 (1985) . 73. See supra note 71. Another first-best approach would eliminate concurrent jurisdiction. But this too seems unlikely. Modern choice of law, not to mention modern regulation and modern life, make it so that overlapping prescriptive jurisdiction is a feature of the system. But see Buxbaum, supra note 70 (arguing for this approach with respect to one slice of the law).
74. There has been some progress in this field, including an international arbitration jurisdiction and judgments have stalled, 75 and it is hard to believe that class-action judgments would produce international consensus any time soon.
76
In the absence of an international law of preclusion, second-best alternatives prioritize preclusion symmetry or aggregation. 77 The courts mentioned above have chosen preclusion over aggregation. While opt-in proposals sound like they avoid the aggregation-preclusion tradeoff, they too choose preclusion over aggregation.
78
Framers of Rule 23 understood that for low-value claims, opting in was not realistic. 79 More recent scholarly treatments have described opt-out regimes as responding to opt-in's shortcomings with respect to collective-action problems within the putative class, costs to social values such as deterrence, and finality problems. PROCEDURE § 1787 PROCEDURE § , at 521-22 (3d ed. 2005 ) ("The ability of a member to secure the benefits of a successful termination of the action without affirmatively pressing an individual claim is particularly important because it assures that small claimants who would be unable to protect their rights through separate suits can take advantage of the judgment in the class action without the burden of actually participating. It was for this reason that the 1966 Advisory Committee specifically rejected the notion of requiring absent class members to opt into the action to secure its benefits." (footnote omitted)); see also 1879-89 (2013) . For the underwhelming effects of opt-in under the Fair Labor Standards Act, a minimum, opt-in reduces the number of plaintiffs, which necessarily reduces the number of individuals receiving compensation and (perhaps more importantly in many low-value cases) reduces the deterrence of wrongful behavior directly through the threat of damage awards or indirectly through the insurance market.
81
Exclusion or opt-in remedies have dominated the discourse on transnational class actions, but these approaches are misguided and not entirely justified. First, Subpart A will explain that these approaches misapprehend the risk of foreign relitigation. Citizenship misses the mark, and courts may lack the information necessary to identify relevant option holders. This informational problem is important because, as Subpart A further explains, the likelihood of relitigation is uneven and probably lower than many assume. Subpart B then turns to those countervailing considerations that justify including option holders in U.S. class actions. Not only do exclusionary approaches fail, but they also create costs to deterrence and fairness that can be avoided by including all plaintiffs with valid claims. For these reasons, courts should reject exclusionary remedies and allow foreign option holders to remain in transnational class actions.
Before exploring these topics more fully, it is important to identify a few issues that are not relevant but occasionally seep into the debate. First, this Part is not about the merits of class actions generally. 82 Nor does it explore the optimal class size 83 or the optimal number of adjudications. 84 These are worthy inquiries, but their answers have no special bearing on the cases in this Article. In addition, this Part assumes that the putative class would meet other class-action requirements. 85 For example, opt-out class actions require notice to potential plaintiffs, 86 and in theory it could be more difficult to effect proper notice to overseas plaintiffs. This Article assumes that such problems can be overcome. 87 In a similar vein, the putative foreign class members discussed here are assumed to have properly stated claims. 88 There is no question that the United States has prescriptive jurisdiction as a matter of statutory see generally Charlotte S. Alexander 92 Finally, I refer throughout to the source of the substantive law, rights, and remedial scheme, by which I mean the substantive law under which plaintiffs bring their causes of action. 93 For reasons discussed below, there are substantive and structural reasons to link procedural mechanisms with the source of substantive rights. 94 For this Part, therefore, I assume that the source of the substantive law provides for class actions-for example, a U.S. federal-law claim to which the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply.
A. Assessing Relitigation Risk
As one article put it, "The principal concern driving the exclusion of foreign citizens is the fear of relitigation."
95 But the judicial approaches described above are not well suited to identify when that fear is justified, and indeed there are reasons to doubt that courts would be capable of doing so.
To begin with, the exclusion remedy is fundamentally flawed in its focus on citizenship. Current judicial and scholarly approaches seek to identify foreign jurisdictions that will not recognize U.S. judgments and then exclude their citizens from class treatment. But many court systems are open to domestic and foreign plaintiffs. Concluding that a German court will not recognize a U.S. class judgment means that all plaintiffs with causes of action in Germany-not just German citizens-could be option holders. This insight has two important implications. First, courts relying on citizenship are not properly targeting option holders. (This Subpart returns to the challenge of identifying option holders shortly.) Second, were courts to take seriously an approach that excluded option holders, then the existence of any nonrecognizing foreign forum with a plausible connection to the litigation could turn all plaintiffs into option holders and thus subject them to exclusion. 99 Although some judges and scholars might cheer for the demise of the opt-out class action, it would be odd to permit a foreign court's preclusion choices to strike the death knell.
One potential response to this critique is that citizenship is proxy for litigation convenience-it would be easier for French litigants to sue in Paris than in Berlin or New York. But gone are the days when a party physically files her case at the courthouse, and, in any event, one would expect an enterprising plaintiffs' attorney to match up a suitable plaintiff with an amenable forum.
100
Replacing citizenship with a cause-of-action test would be an improvement but it would not account for the likelihood of relitigation. The mere availability of foreign causes of action is insufficient to lead to relitigation unless such suits are cost effective for plaintiffs-and, perhaps more importantly, plaintiffs' counsel. 98. Simard and Tidmarsh also acknowledged that foreign courts are open to noncitizen plaintiffs, but they excluded American plaintiffs from this insight. Simard & Tidmarsh, supra note 66, at 91 n.12. Although U.S. courts may have more flexibility to enjoin an American plaintiff abroad, there are reasons to doubt this limitation in practice, including limits on personal jurisdiction and antisuit-injunction authority. See, e.g., Henry Paul Monaghan, Antisuit Injunctions and Preclusion Against Absent Nonresident Class Members, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1148 , 1179 (1998 . More to the point, the U.S. court has no power to enjoin the foreign court. If a foreign court were willing to allow relitigation by foreign passive plaintiffs, could it not reach the same conclusion for American passive plaintiffs regardless of U.S. law?
99. Perhaps foreign courts would not be open to all potential U.S.-court plaintiffs. For example, the foreign state may not recognize a cause of action for securities fraud on a foreign exchange. Cf. Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 130 S. Ct. , 2888 130 S. Ct. (2010 . But it is doubtful that substantive law limits will resolve all cases, though it may create further distinctions among potential class members. And, in any event, this does not resolve the question of cost-effectiveness. See infra notes 101-06 and accompanying text.
100. Indeed, at least one American law firm has developed a cottage industry in foreign-court securities suits on behalf of purchasers dismissed from U.S. cases based on the Morrison decision. Grant & Eisenhofer has collaborated on suits in the Netherlands against Fortis, in Germany against Porsche and Volkswagen, in France against Vivendi Universal, in Japan against Olympus, and in the United Kingdom against the Royal Bank of Scotland. Practice Areas: Securities Litigation, GRANT & EISENHOFER, http://www.gelaw.com/practice -areas/securities-litigation.
101. This assumption applies to anyone with stakes in the litigation: all plaintiffs, the subset example, for a small-claim class action, relitigation in a foreign jurisdiction may be unlikely unless that court had an effective aggregation mechanism sufficient to overcome collective-action problems. Similarly, the ability to bring a cost-effective suit abroad may depend on the foreign jurisdiction's approaches to attorney compensation, 102 filing fees, 103 or damages. 104 A U.S. court trying to determine the reasonable likelihood of relitigation thus would need more information about foreign litigation procedure and practice. Moreover, a switch from citizenship to causes of action would not relieve the courts of the notoriously difficult task of assessing foreign preclusion law-that is, whether the foreign court would treat a U.S. class judgment as preclusive.
105 Indeed, courts addressing this question in transnational class actions have come to opposite conclusions about the same foreign courts.
106 Finally, courts seeking to answer any of these questions would need to rely on motivated party presentations.
107 At best, therefore, courts have imperfect information about foreign alternatives and they may struggle to remedy that deficiency.
of plaintiffs footing the bill, class counsel (on contingency or through credit), alternative litigation financers, or providers of "after the event" litigation insurance. 107. See Clopton, supra note 6 (noting some conflicting expert declarations); see also infra Part III.A (discussing private preclusion's response to this dynamic). In a sense the same critique could be leveled at all fact finding in which courts depend on party presentations. At least three responses are relevant here. First, prior approaches to preclusion asymmetry assume (or at least seem to assume) that courts can do reasonably well at identifying threats of relitigation. This assumption seems unwarranted. Second, for the reasons described here, this particular task is difficult. Third, as explained shortly, because the risk of relitigation is likely low, we should be particularly wary of courts over-claiming with respect to option holders.
So far this Subpart has explained that exclusion remedies tied to citizenship are misguided and that courts are poorly positioned to identify realistic threats of relitigation. These conclusions do not depend on the empirical question regarding the size of the problem-that is, how many plaintiffs in how many cases will relitigate a transnational class action? That said, there are reasons to believe that relitigation risk is lower than the courts imply. 108 To begin with, it would be rational to file first in the jurisdiction offering the best cost-benefit result.
109 American class actions are attractive, for example, because the combination of class procedures, punitive damages, juries, and other features of U.S. law make the expected return higher than foreign alternatives.
Furthermore, the outcome of the first litigation may have an effect on the cost-benefit calculation in the second forum. The first judgment also could affect the second adjudication if it receives something less than preclusive value-for example, persuasive or evidentiary weight. 110 A defendant's victory in the first case also might change a plaintiff's assessment of her case's strength, or it might send this signal to potential litigation funders or providers of litigation insurance.
111 And as long as some plaintiffs are bound by the first result, the per capita value of the second litigation likely will be reduced.
112
Finally, it is reasonable to assume that second-best alternatives to U.S. class actions would be other forums with class-action-like mechanisms. But those jurisdictions with class-like procedures are likely to be more willing to recognize class judgments, as presumably these jurisdictions have overcome some of the due process concerns with binding absentees.
113
For all of these reasons, therefore, the likelihood of cost-effective relitigation in a foreign forum may not be high and certainly will not be distributed evenly across cases and option holders.
108. The low probability of relitigation is significant in two respects: it suggests courts may be at greater risk to overstate (rather than understate) relevant option holders, and it further augurs for skepticism of exclusion.
109. Again, the relevant actor here may be a plaintiffs' attorney. 111. See Molot, supra note 101, at 1822 (noting the United Kingdom has "two additional sets of eyes critically evaluating a claim's merits"); supra note 101 (discussing class counsel and other funders). A prior adverse judgment also could increase the likelihood that a foreign court would deem the second suit frivolous or worthy of sanctions.
112. Total recovery in the second litigation will be lower because the overall claim is smaller due to a smaller class and potential setoff, see Simard & Tidmarsh, supra note 66, at 103 n.52 (discussing setoffs), while litigation costs will be spread across fewer plaintiffs. 
B. Costs of Exclusion
The previous Subpart suggested that current approaches are poorly attuned to litigation options, and the risk of relitigation they seek to address is unclear, uneven, and may be quite low. This Subpart furthers that case by exploring the costs of excluding option holders.
Courts and scholars calling for exclusion treat litigation options as intolerable but preclusion asymmetries are not unique to transnational class actions, and in other circumstances, courts tolerate such asymmetries in service of other goals. Most prominent is the doctrine of nonmutual offensive issue preclusion. In Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 114 stockholders sued Parklane based on an allegedly false and misleading proxy statement. Before the class action reached final judgment, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) separately sued Parklane on essentially the same basis and obtained a declaratory judgment. 115 The stockholders sought to apply the prior judgment as preclusive against Parklane.
116 Parklane contended that this was unfair because a judgment against the SEC (and in favor of Parklane) would not have been preclusive against the stockholders.
117 Permitting preclusion in this situation, therefore, would be asymmetric. 118 The Supreme Court acknowledged this asymmetry but concluded that judicial economy and litigant interests outweighed asymmetric preclusion. 119 Similarly, in the last few years, the Supreme Court countenanced litigation asymmetries with respect to class certification, 120 125. Professors Simard and Tidmarsh considered deterrence, compensation, and judicial efficiency, see Simard & Tidmarsh, supra note 66, at 128, and Walker and Buschkin also addressed deterrence as a rationale for including foreign plaintiffs, see Walker, supra note 63, at 781; Buschkin, supra note 63, at 1594-99. Which values matter will depend on the relevant substantive law. For ease of explanation, this Subpart will use U.S. law and policy to provide it, these countervailing considerations further support including foreign citizens in U.S. class actions.
Deterrence (and Compensation)
The concern with litigation options is that they will result in overdeterrence and overcompensation, but the exclusion of option holders risks the opposite effect.
126 In addition to compensating victims, litigation should compel internalization of costs and deter inefficient conduct. 127 In repeated individual litigation, defendants can take advantage of economies of scale not available to plaintiffs; only when plaintiffs can pool their cases do they approach equal footing with defendants. 128 In service of deterrence, therefore, class actions reduce asymmetries between defendants and plaintiffs with mass claims. 129 The opt-out class action does one better: to eliminate transaction costs of getting each claimant to sign up, Rule 23 starts from the position of inclusion within a defined, certified class.
130
Remedying litigation asymmetries thus counteracts the endemic underdeterrence problem of small-value cases.
131 But the exclusion of option holders with valid claims reduces this deterrent effect by reducing the size of the plaintiff class. Furthermore, if courts are willing to exclude option holders, defendants might use the threat of exclusion to negotiate suboptimal settlements. Defendants could threaten to seek exclusion of option holders in pursuit of a lower settlement, and these background considerations. Cf. Simard & Tidmarsh, supra note 66, at 124-25 (expressing a preference for the court offering the highest expected value irrespective of the substantive law's values).
126. This Subpart primarily discusses deterrence, but deterrence and compensation should move together-though in low-value class actions, the deterrent effect may swallow individual compensation. See generally Shapiro, supra note 20 (conceptualizing class-action recoveries as compensation to the class, not to individuals).
127. Class actions, at least negative-expected-value class actions, are justified on this deterrence rationale. See, e.g REV. 849, 902-05 (1984) .
courts would approve such settlements because neither defendants' nor plaintiffs' counsel would have the incentive to tell courts about the litigation options.
132
The magnitude of underdeterrence (or overdeterrence) is an empirical question beyond the scope of this project. At a minimum, though, underdeterrence must be acknowledged as a countervailing consideration in dealing with litigation options, and it is notable that the courts adopting the exclusion remedy fail to grapple with it. 133 Moreover, there are reasons to think underdeterrence may be more of a problem in these cases. As explained earlier, the risk of relitigation-and thus the risk of overdeterrence-has been exaggerated. 134 Courts in the United States remain friendly venues for litigation, and recoveries abroad seemingly do not reach the heights of U.S. recoveries. 135 The outcome of the first proceeding may affect (if not preclude) relitigation, and relitigating plaintiffs will be seeking smaller expected returns while sharing costs over a narrower base. 137. E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1) (numerosity). 138. Perhaps all putative claims are required to justify litigation costs, or option holders possess particularly valuable claims. Admittedly, for positive-expected-value cases, deterrence and compensation justifications are weaker (because these cases could proceed individually), and governance problems are worse (because individual autonomy interests are stronger). These arguments suggest caution generally in positive-value cases and, in practice, U.S. courts have been fairly hostile to positive-value class actions. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U. S. 591, 617 (1997); Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 748-49 (5th Cir. 1996) . Still, even if claims are positive value in U.S. and foreign courts, a U.S. court seeking to achieve U.S.-levels of deterrence, see infra note 139, or intent on vindicating related smaller claims may include positive-value option holders in U.S. class actions.
139. Even if claims were viable in the foreign jurisdiction, a decision to exclude option holders would result in underdeterrence if expected recoveries abroad are lower than in the United States. In the unlikely event that expected recoveries are higher in the second forum, see supra note 135, excluding class members could result in overdeterrence as measured against U.S. recoveries. By binding even a subset of claimants, inclusion could help to minimize this overdeterrence problem-that is, it could reduce the number and scope of viable 2. Plaintiff Dynamics Class actions also respond to collective-action problems among potential plaintiffs. 140 In a putative class action, each plaintiff would prefer to free ride on other plaintiffs-each one wants a litigation option. Solving this collective-action problem among plaintiffs is important for deterrence and compensation, and to ensure fairness within the putative class.
Although it may seem that including option holders would be unfair to other plaintiffs, 141 the exclusion of otherwise plausible class members would create a class of free riders. If option holders are included in the class, they share the costs of litigation with other class members.
142 But if option holders are excluded, they may receive some benefits from a successful suit without contributing to litigation expenses-the option holders could benefit from nonmutual offensive issue preclusion 143 or simply reuse the work done in the first case. In this respect, litigation options in transnational class actions are less costly (and more fair) than options in nonmutual estoppel cases like Parklane because litigation option holders share costs while estoppel option holders do not. 144 Nor is inclusion unfair to the option holders. The class should operate in service of all U.S. claims, 145 and all class members (including option holders) retain their "voice" and "exit" rights. 146 And, because they retain the option to relitigate unless they affirmatively give it up, inclusion should foreign cases (through preclusion or setoff) even if it does not eliminate relitigation completely. See infra note 181 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text. 141. See infra note 187 and accompanying text (discussing intraclass inequities). 142. In successful cases, option holders cash in, and attorney fees are paid out of the joint recovery. In unsuccessful cases, the contingent-fee arrangement means that no class member pays the costs of litigation. One might say that all plaintiffs are paying this cost in higher contingency fees, but again those costs are shared among all plaintiffs-option holders and non-option holders alike. See generally Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too Little?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2043 REV. (2010 .
143. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery, Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) . Excluded plaintiffs could bring a new suit in a U.S. court and rely on a prior favorable judgment, or a foreign court could treat the judgment as preclusive against the defendant (or as persuasive evidence against the defendant's case 145. An outcome should not be deemed inadequate because it does not compensate the option holders for waiving relitigation. Similarly, Professor Woolley has explained that adequacy of representation should be evaluated in light of the substantive remedial scheme. Woolley, supra note 20, at 604-07.
146. See Coffee, supra note 20, at 376 (defining "exit" and "voice" mechanisms in class actions). leave option holders no worse off than before.
147
The foregoing discussion touches on issues of autonomy. 148 Many scholarly debates about class actions are understood as pitting those who are concerned with litigant autonomy against those who are concerned with social values such as deterrence. 149 The fact that most of the attention in this Article is given to social welfare should not be understood as relegating autonomy to second class. Instead, this Article focuses on social values because choices about class definitions have potentially profound effects on social outcomes, but whether German passive plaintiffs are included or excluded has no effect on the due-process protections afforded to all plaintiffs. 150 Instead, the point here is that plaintiff interests, in addition to social interests in deterrence, may support the inclusion of foreign option holders in U.S. class actions.
151
Current approaches that exclude option holders are ineffective at identifying the class of plaintiffs likely to relitigate their cases in foreign courts. Courts rely on citizenship when they should ask which plaintiffs may have cost-effective causes of action, taking into account a host of judgments about foreign litigation opportunities. Even if courts asked the right questions, their information and incentives to answer these questions accurately are weak. At the same time, the exclusion of option holders creates real costs to deterrence, compensation, and intraclass fairness. This Article explained why relitigation in foreign courts may be unlikely (and uneven), but disruptions to deterrence from excluding option holders are likely-putative plaintiffs who lack individual incentives to sue abroad will not contribute to the social deterrence function of law. Similarly, litigation costs are only shared among participating class members.
For the reasons explained in this Part, a judge facing a transnational class action should start from a default inclusionary rule. Of course, the court will make all sorts of assessments about the viability of the class action and the process due its members, but it should not simply exclude class members with litigation options. Again, this approach is second-best, possibly sacrificing some preclusion as compared to a 147. This "do no harm" approach is common in this area. See, e.g., Jay Tidmarsh, Rethinking Adequacy of Representation, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1137 REV. , 1177 REV. (2009 148. Exclusion of foreign plaintiffs also potentially touches on an equality norm because it treats litigants differently based on citizenship. Courts would point to a neutral criterionlitigation options-though this Article demonstrated that citizenship is not a perfect match for optionality. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
149. See, e.g., Nagareda, Autonomy, Peace, and Put Options, supra note 16, at 752-55 (discussing one such debate).
150. See Issacharoff, Assembling Class Actions, supra note 36, at 702-09; Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy, supra note 20, at 353-66.
151. One interest not discussed here is judicial economy, which is often invoked as a justification for preclusion. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery, Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979) (noting that preclusion law "promot[es] judicial economy by preventing needless litigation"). The case for judicial economy is complicated by the class action mechanism, see Dam, supra note 15, at 48, and it is not clear what effect excluding option holders would have on U.S. or global judicial costs. And although excluding option holders will make some U.S. classes nonviable, this would represent bare exchanges of judicial resources for deterrence and compensation. Finally, the administrative costs of ascertaining which class members to exclude are not trivial. See supra Part II.A. (discussing the challenges of identifying option holders).
full-faith-and-credit regime. To that end, once transnational classes are certified, the next step is to identify other ways to achieve interjurisdictional preclusion. In the next Part, this Article shows that private information and incentives can do this work while remaining faithful to substantive remedial choices.
III. RESPONDING TO LITIGATION OPTIONS
The previous Part explained why courts should certify classes including foreign plaintiffs despite the risk that some of them possess litigation options. This is not to suggest, however, that litigation options are preferred. The challenge is identifying valuable litigation options and responding without losing the social benefits of aggregation. This Part describes approaches that respond to litigation options by harnessing the incentives and information of private parties and targeting those efforts toward preclusion (rather than toward aggregation). These approaches are not perfect-as noted above, without interjurisdictional preclusion law, responses are at most second best 152 -but they improve on judicial and scholarly proposals to date. Subpart A reviews the core recommendation of a private-preclusion model.
153
Subpart B discusses alternative approaches for concurrent proceedings, and Subpart C addresses a few other permutations arising from particular features of interjurisdictional litigation. These suggestions are framed as responses to litigation asymmetries. Another way to view these suggestions, though, is as a continued defense of including foreign option holders in transnational class actions. If parties have mechanisms to limit the negative effects of relitigation risk, then we should be even less willing to accept exclusion.
154
The approaches described in this Part are post-dispute, meaning that they involve party and court action after a cause of action accrues (and often after a case is filed). Pre-dispute approaches also may be available in some cases. For example, with respect to securities litigation, issuers may be able to include exclusive forum selection provisions in corporate bylaws, avoiding litigation options by eliminating the second forum (assuming that the second forum enforces the forum selection agreement). 155 25-35 (1959) ). These rules set initial entitlements, but they allow private flexibility to harness market forces and counteract ex ante information asymmetries. Sunstein talked mostly about substantive rules, but this concept is useful for procedural questions as well. 155. See George S. Geis, Shareholder Derivative Litigation and the Preclusion Problem, 100 VA. L. REV. 261, 297-303 (2014) . Importantly, in some contexts a post-dispute agreement similar approach could exist in other areas in which plaintiffs and defendants have pre-dispute relationships.
156 Nothing in this Article should be read to undermine these approaches. Indeed, they are welcomed both as responses to litigation options and as further evidence that the risk of relitigation may be overstated.
A. Private Preclusion
A private response to litigation optionality relies on what this Subpart calls "private preclusion."
157 Before discussing the merits and mechanics of private preclusion, it is helpful to begin with a stylized version of this approach. This story is illustrative: it necessarily blurs some details, and it is but one example of how private preclusion might take shape.
Imagine a class action filed in a U.S. court in which some subset of plaintiffs may have causes of action in Canada, Austria, or Germany. For the reasons described in the previous Part, the U.S. judge certifies the class even though foreign courts may not treat the U.S. judgment as binding on passive plaintiffs. At the time of certification, 158 defendant approaches plaintiffs' counsel to negotiate a private preclusion agreement. In this particular (hypothetical) case, defendant concludes that will fare better than a pre-dispute one. See infra note 170 and accompanying text (discussing European approaches). 157. This Subpart's treatment of class-action practice as a market transaction is not novel. As Professor Rubenstein put it:
The core premise of the transactional model is that complex multiparty litigation resembles a transaction more than it resembles a conventional adversarial lawsuit. What is bought and sold are rights-to-sue. . Some readers might object to this commodification of litigation, and such objections have been leveled against other authors writing in this vein. A common response is that transactional approaches are descriptive, not normative. E.g., Rubenstein, supra note 16, at 431 ("The transactional model [of class actions] is an explanatory device and pedagogical tool, not a normative proposal. The model does not suggest that this is what lawyers and judges should be doing, so much as it characterizes what they are doing in certain large, important cases."). But advocating for a private approach to preclusion law, I must concede that I am adding some normative content to this descriptive baseline. In part, this emphasis is justified-the market is one institution that can solve public policy problems, and it should be used when appropriate. I would hasten to add that I have not advocated a market solution for market's sake. Indeed, I have suggested above that a public approach (i.e., an international treaty) might be preferable.
158. As explained below, private preclusion also may be proposed at settlement or judgment. See infra notes 168-69. the risk of relitigation in an Austrian court is high, so the agreement provides Austrian option holders 159 with a promise of a thirty percent premium on top of the U.S. recovery in exchange for a release of their claims in Austrian courts. 160 Because defendant believes the risk of relitigation in German courts is lower, defendant offers only a ten percent premium to German option holders. And because defendant is confident that Canadian courts will recognize the U.S. judgment, no private preclusion offer is extended to Canadian option holders.
Attorneys for both parties agree on the wording of these offers, and then the court notifies option holders of the private preclusion offer using the normal procedure for sending opt-out notices. 161 Although the offers are negotiated on a subclass-wide basis, individualized consent would be required to release the foreign claims and qualify for the premium recovery.
162 Plaintiffs' counsel (whose fee may be increased if the total recovery is increased) and defendant (who seeks to avoid costly relitigation) work together to identify option holders and encourage them to take the deal.
After the period for accepting the offer closes, the case proceeds along the standard path. If defendant wins a dismissal, then any option holder who signed the release will be bound by that judgment. If plaintiffs win (or settle), then those plaintiffs who signed the private preclusion agreements will receive additional compensation on top of the baseline recovery. Again, any plaintiff who signed a release will not be able to relitigate their case abroad, even if the U.S. recovery is lower than they hoped. And importantly, any plaintiff who signed a release also could not be a passive member of a foreign opt-out class action, which may present the most serious risk of cost-effective relitigation.
163
This stylized version of private preclusion reveals potential advantages of a private approach to litigation options. Unlike the exclusion remedy described above, private preclusion relies on parties rather than judges to identify which option holders matter. The parties may have private information about relitigation risk unavailable to courts, and they have incentives to acquire that information. 164 Thus, defendants can make a case-by-case assessment of the risk of relitigation and only then approach plaintiffs with a private preclusion proposal. 160. The release also could be worded to release all claims in any court (not only Austrian courts).
161. If the agreement occurs at disposition, then presumably the court would use the analogous notification method. See infra notes 168-69. And, as described below, the parties may supplement the notice as needed. See infra Part III.C.
162. See infra note 170 and accompanying text (discussing individualized consent). 163. See infra note 168. 164. See supra Part III.A (discussing this issue). Recall that current judicial and scholarly approaches rely on judges to identify option holders. See supra Part II (collecting judicial and scholarly sources). Simard and Tidmarsh most directly focus on the informational challenge, but they too rely on courts. Simard & Tidmarsh, supra note 66, 165. One potential caution with respect to private preclusion is a concern with negative signaling-that is, the notion that defendants might worry that any offer would signal a weak case or a willingness to settle. See, e.g Private preclusion is also more flexible than exclusion. Courts have only crude tools to respond to option holders-they can certify or not certify classes with foreign option holders, and they can approve or reject proposed settlements. But private parties have continuous rather than discrete choices. As a result, not only can parties price preclusion more accurately, but they can also act on that information with calibrated offers, such as the proposal to offer thirty percent to Austrian option holders and ten percent to German option holders.
166
The role of consent is also important for the efficacy of this approach. Individual consent blunts some foreign objections to the opt-out class action. Whether made at the time of certification, 167 settlement, 168 or judgment, 169 private preclusion agreements are consensual, postdispute contracts, which should fare much better in foreign courts. 170 At the same time, this proposal presumptively includes option means that a preclusion offer need not come with a negative signal about the underlying merits, nor is it obvious that a defendant willing to make such a contingent offer would be more or less likely to settle the entire case. It is true that a private preclusion offer sends a signal that some plaintiffs may have causes of action in other courts, but it should hardly surprise an Austrian plaintiff (or an Austrian plaintiffs' attorney) that she may be able to sue in her home court. Finally, private preclusion offers are voluntary, and if a defendant believes that the signal value trumps the savings from avoiding relitigation, so be it. 166. Prior scholarship has highlighted efforts by defendants to discourage opt outs-in other words, negotiating for preclusion. Professor Nagareda helpfully categorized methods by which defendants seek to reduce opt outs in class settlements. Nagareda, Preexistence Principle, supra note 16, at 205-19. Professor Rave also noted at least one case, In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d 184 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) , in which a defendant included "bonus payments," increasing the per capita settlement value if certain thresholds of participation were met. D. Theodore Rave, Governing the Anticommons in Aggregate Litigation, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1183 REV. , 1196 REV. (2013 .
167. This Part began with a certification example. See supra notes 158-63 and accompanying text. Notably, agreements at certification are effective if the outcome is a settlement, judgment for plaintiffs, or judgment for defendant.
168. Class-action settlements may not be sufficient to bar relitigation because they do not require individualized consent and not all passive plaintiffs will claim on the settlement fund. See supra note 136 (describing underclaiming). Thus, defendants could offer private preclusion on top of the baseline settlement amount to induce additional consent. Although one might think that passive plaintiffs who do not claim on the settlement fund are also not likely to relitigate abroad, passive plaintiffs who do not file claims remain setoff-free candidates for opt-out class actions in foreign forums.
169. Courts could impose preclusion terms on judgment claims, requiring that plaintiffs sign releases consonant with that jurisdiction's preclusion law in order to claim on the judgment fund. Cf. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw. v. EEOC, 446 U. S. 318, 333 (1980) ("[T] he court may reasonably require any individual who claims under its judgment [for the government] to relinquish his right to bring a separate private action."). These judicial releases should track the full-faith-and-credit approach described above. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text. Defendants also could propose private preclusion offers to effect notice to plaintiffs of final judgments.
170. Private preclusion agreements are not contracts of adhesion; they are negotiated after the claim arises; and they necessarily allow for vindication of rights because they permit the U.S. class action to proceed. Cf. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 , 2014 -20 (2013 (Kagan, J., dissenting) ; AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, holders in the class. Thus, unlike opt-in mechanisms, 171 private preclusion agreements allow courts to capture the benefits of aggregation while separately working to reduce costly relitigation.
172
Of course, this private approach to preclusion will work only if agreements create value for both sides and if plaintiffs actively consent. First, it is important to acknowledge the transaction costs of negotiating private-preclusion offers, though these costs will be reduced because defendants will make subclass-wide offers, 173 rather than negotiating individualized contracts with every class member. 174 Moreover, private-preclusion agreements need not reduce transaction costs to zero to create value for the parties.
175 Instead, if the costs of negotiation are less than the cost of litigation in the second court, there should be a zone of agreement that allows both sides to benefit. . More generally, with sufficient time and incentive, attorneys would likely be able to craft agreements, signed by both parties after the dispute arose, that would be binding in foreign courts. Indeed, this is the business of settlements and releases. 171. In this way, private preclusion agreements do not undermine the viability of a U.S. class, unlike settlements that "buy off" named plaintiffs in order to moot the case, see, e.g., Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U. S. 326, 340 (1980) , or settlements with high-value claimants that unravel the class, see, e.g., Bone, supra note 121, at 599-600 (discussing this possibility). But these techniques could target foreign relitigation.
172 REV. 209 (2000) . to class recovery, 177 then those attorneys will have incentives to work with defendants to identify value-enhancing agreements, negotiate their terms, and market them to option holders. 178 Private-preclusion agreements also may tap into party preferences. In other contexts, defendants have been known to offer "peace premiums" to buy the certainty and efficiency of global settlement, and there may be some defendants that prefer a certain outcome in these cases. 179 And unlike opt-in regimes, defendants here have incentives to make the notices effective.
Another advantage of private preclusion is that it may reduce the value of future foreign litigation. Every plaintiff that signs a private preclusion agreement is one fewer member of a foreign class action or other aggregate litigation. 180 This reduces the value of foreign relitigation, which encourages more plaintiffs to join private preclusion. And eventually, enough plaintiffs could agree to make foreign relitigation untenable. Indeed, defendants could price preclusion offers just high enough to achieve this outcome-creating separation among plaintiffs based on their claim size, attention to the case, risk aversion, or other criteria.
181
Two additional concerns should be dealt with here: agency costs and intraclass inequity. First, readers may be concerned that a proposal that enlists class counsel to help defendants buy preclusion exacerbates the agency problem between attorney and class. Agency costs are endemic to class proceedings 182 but they are costs that lawmakers have been willing to bear, and steps have been taken to ameliorate these costs through judicial supervision of representation 183 and settlement. 184 Further work on agency costs in class actions is needed, but it would not single out litigation options. With respect to private preclusion in particular, class counsel should profit only if she increases plaintiff recovery-principal and agent incentives should be 177. As the Ninth Circuit recently said, "Courts try to ensure faithful representation by . . . tether[ing] the value of an attorneys' fees award to the value of the class recovery." In re HP Inkjet Printer Litig., 716 F.3d 1173 , 1178 (9th Cir. 2013 . Indeed, the size of the recovery fund is the best predictor of attorney fees regardless of the fee formula used. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees in Class Action Settlements: An Empirical Study, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 27, 76 (2004) .
178. This suggestion might raise concerns that class counsel and defendants will collude at the expense of class interests. This issue is discussed later in this Subpart. See infra notes 182-86 and accompanying text.
179. See Rave, supra note 166, at 1193-95 (discussing these reasons and others). 180. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 181. For example, it may be that a certain number of foreign claimants (or a certain total claim value) are necessary to qualify for aggregation. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1) (numerosity). Or, it may be that a certain number of active plaintiffs are necessary to make the case cost-effective. See supra note 171. Even if the foreign jurisdiction has opt-out mechanisms, the effective value of the foreign judgment will depend on the number of actual claims on the judgment fund. But these divide-and-conquer strategies operate against a background in which all plaintiffs retain their causes of action in U. S Second, readers also might worry that private preclusion is unfair because some option holders may do better than other plaintiffs. As a descriptive matter, this is of course correct-even if private preclusion is uncommon, in certain cases defendants may compensate some plaintiffs more than others. Notably, these intraclass differences are the product of substantive law. Legislative choices, not procedural ones, produce any unequal treatment. 187 Further, these inequities would exist whether or not private preclusion were available, and if preclusion is priced right, option holders obtain no greater return (and defendants pay no greater amount) than possible under current law. More mechanically, private-preclusion offers should not give option holders larger stakes in common-fund judgments, 188 COOPERATION (1984) . However, it is doubtful that an exclusionary approach would be particularly effective in changing foreign-state behavior. As Professor Coyle's political-economy analysis suggests, reciprocity affects behavior if it targets concentrated interests, but exclusion here would target diffuse, unorganized option holders. See John F. Coyle, Rethinking Judgments Reciprocity, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1109 REV. , 1131 REV. -43 (2014 . At the same time, potential defendants also may be foreign citizens, and likely would lobby against such a rule. See, e.g., Kern v. Siemens Corp., 393 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2004 To summarize briefly, private preclusion may be a viable response to some litigation options. At a minimum, it shifts responsibility for identifying option holders to parties with better information, and the responses to options can be continuous rather than discrete. Private preclusion aligns the incentives of defendants, plaintiffs, and class counsel, and it allows the parties with the best information to value preclusion in each suit. Contrary to traditional notions of opt-in, which make participation (and deterrence) contingent on consent, private preclusion preserves the social benefits of aggregation in every case and makes preclusion available when most valuable to the parties. For many cases, asking defendants to put a price on preclusion will reveal that it is of little or no value-relitigation may not be a true threat.
191 But for those cases in which relitigation matters, private preclusion can respond proportionally, pricing preclusion to the case at hand.
192
B. Concurrent Proceedings
Concurrent proceedings also may present avenues for increased preclusion. Most of the discussion so far has addressed a class action filed in a single jurisdiction. But if enterprising plaintiffs' attorneys in different jurisdictions see the same promising case, each might choose to file an overlapping class action in a different court.
"Dueling class actions" 193 have drawn attention in the domestic setting, particularly with respect to the reverse-auction problem. As Professors Coffee and Wasserman, among others, have explained, if different class counsel file concurrent cases representing the same class, defendants can bid them against each other with the carrot of an attorney-fee award.
194 Individual plaintiffs may lack incentives to monitor counsel effectively, and courts only hear about settlement after it is negotiated.
195
The reverse-auction problem exists in transnational dueling class actions as well, but the presence of litigation options may actually mitigate this problem and allow courts to increase the preclusive effect of judgments. Domestic dueling class actions create significant reverse-auction problems because full faith and credit permits a judicially enforced settlement in one state to be preclusive in other states' courts. 'Y 105, 131 (1997) .
191. For a discussion of some of the reasons (beyond transaction costs) that these agreements may have not materialized to date, see supra note 62. And for further discussion of transactions costs, see supra note 175 and accompanying text.
192. Private preclusion also may be available in domestic cases in which preclusion is uncertain. For example, if defendants worry about collateral attack in domestic class actions, preclusion agreements could be worth the cost of negotiation. See supra Part II.B (discussing other domestic litigation options). For an alternative discussion of preclusion bargaining, see Alan M. Trammell, Transactionalism Costs, 100 VA. L. REV. 1211 REV. , 1245 REV. -68 (2014 But because there is no international full-faith-and-credit rule, both courts would need to review the settlement before enforcing it. And importantly, the second judge may have access to better information about the merits of the settlement than the first judge who endorsed it. In the first case, defendant and class counsel have an interest in getting the settlement approved with the least possible effort. Thus, they will present the first judge with information slanted toward approval. 197 But in a second (foreign) court, the judge will hear from an expert objector-class counsel from the second case-with incentives to highlight shortcomings in the settlement. 198 
C. Other Approaches
Private-preclusion and dueling-class resolutions are just two ways courts may use private incentives and information to supplement preclusion law. But they are not alone, and courts and parties should be encouraged to innovate new techniques where possible.
For example, parties have incentives not only to identify foreign courts that create the threat of relitigation, 207 but also to learn the specific requirements for recognition in those jurisdictions. Courts should explore with parties those procedural steps that could increase the likelihood of preclusion abroad and allow defendants to fund such protections if they choose to do so. It may be, for example, that a relevant foreign court would recognize a U.S. judgment if notice of opt-out rights were effected in a particular manner.
208 Defendants should be permitted to fund this notice, subject to court supervision. 209 Alternatively, if a foreign court permits representative litigation only for certain classes of claims or organizations, defendants could investigate how those regimes could integrate with judgment-recognition procedures.
210
More generally, parties should be creative in thinking through responses to litigation options, and courts should entertain those responses rather than simply rejecting option holders out of hand.
211 Exclusion is not the only way to preserve the preclusive effect of U.S. judgments abroad.
207. This assessment involves judgments about both foreign law and the particulars of the case. 208. See, e.g 211. Perhaps courts should look to litigation-funding contracts (in jurisdictions that permit them). These contracts create binding obligations on funders and class members, and those obligations could be leveraged into private preclusion. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. Or perhaps arbitration mechanisms-and concomitant international obligations to enforce arbitral awards-could play a role in bolstering judicial resolutions or private preclusion. The New York Convention establishes international obligations to enforce arbitral awards, and many arbitral proceedings permit settlement-like awards. 
IV. RECOGNIZING TRANSNATIONAL JUDGMENTS
So far this Article has explored methods to link procedure to substantive-law values by aggregating foreign class members and working to achieve additional preclusion in the absence of international law. This Part considers briefly the other side of the coin: defendants requesting recognition of a foreign court's aggregate judgment in a U.S. court. 212 It is only a matter of time before U.S. courts will need to make decisions about the preclusive effects of aggregate judgments that are literally and figuratively foreign to U.S. courts. 213 Earlier discussions have explored many of the issues at stake in these cases but here they must be wedded with domestic approaches to judgment recognition. 214 In responding to foreign aggregate judgments, two paradigms of preclusion policy in U.S. courts may be implicated: recognition of foreign judgments and recognition of domestic class judgments. American foreign-judgment recognition practice is fairly liberal, and U.S. courts will enforce foreign judgments provided minimal due-process requirements were met. 215 Although most judgment recognition is a matter of state law, these rules have coalesced around the federal rule announced in Hilton v. Guyot in 1895. 216 Foreign judgments must meet due-process standards, also gives parties in foreign litigation incentives to determine the price of relitigation in a U.S. court and negotiate accordingly.
CONCLUSION
A perennial question in the study of international litigation is what, if anything, is different about international cases. 236 This Article contributes to that debate in two respects. First, this Article identifies an important aspect of international litigation that may be different: the lack of an international law of preclusion means that there is a risk of litigation options in transnational litigation. Litigation options create asymmetries between parties and within putative classes and thus may upset legislative choices. Because these options may be more prevalent in international litigation, they unsurprisingly have led courts and commentators to propose internationally focused solutions-that is, excluding foreign citizens from class actions in U.S. courts.
The second contribution of this Article cuts back against these claims. Although transnational litigation may be different in the frequency with which it presents litigation options, the responses to those options should draw on the same values as presented in domestic cases. To begin with, aggregation and preclusion do not stand apart. Instead, they must be integrated with substantive law choices on issues such as deterrence, compensation, and fairness. The mere presence of litigation options should not, as some have implied, throw those choices out the window.
When seeking to supplement the preclusion applicable to option holders, transnational litigation also can take advantage of litigation dynamics not unique to international cases. In litigation, transnational or otherwise, parties may have the best information about the strength of the case, the likely course of litigation (or relitigation), and the value of preclusion. Aligning their incentives should have the effect of identifying the market price for preclusion, which can manifest in private agreements that achieve what international law cannot (at least to date). Judges, meanwhile, lack the information and incentives to price preclusion right, not to mention the fact that their tools to respond to litigation options are blunt and imprecise. Not only should transnational class actions look to the same systemic values in order to weigh aggregation and preclusion, but they also may use the same sets of private and public tools to fill gaps in international law.
Indeed, because litigation options are not unique to transnational cases (though they are saliently presented in them), the lessons for responding to transnational litigation options may be valuable for domestic cases as well. Domestic litigation options may arise from nonmutual preclusion doctrine, collateral attacks on domestic class judgments, serial class certification motions, or unpredictable judgments about the scope of prior litigation. 237 No matter the source, litigation optionality implicates substantive law values that may justify preclusion asymmetry, and courts must consider these values when deciding how to respond to litigation options of any kind. Furthermore, this Article's attempt to supplement weak preclusion law with private action also might be relevant to these other litigation options. Agreements to treat an adjudication as binding present an alternative when preclusion law is unavailable or unreliable, or when courts have imperfect information and limited tools. 238 Here, as elsewhere, procedural rules that recognize the realities of litigation and the different capacities of courts and parties can better serve the underlying substantive law.
237. See supra Part II (collecting examples). 238. While transnational class actions typically involve plaintiff-side options, preclusion uncertainty could exist on both sides of the "V." In those cases, rather than one side paying the other to exercise options, the parties could agree to mutual exercise-agreeing to be bound by the first adjudication once and for all. Cf. Trammell, supra note 192, at 1245-68.
